17 September 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: Ms. Laura Denk
Executive Director, ARRB

FROM: J. Barry Harrelson
JFK Project Officer, HRP/OIM

SUBJECT: CIA-IR-35, Source Identified in RIF Number
104-10151-1-206

1. The following is in response to subject request.

2. Searches were made for information responsive to subject request and materials were provided for examination by the ARRB staff. From that examination, staff members selected a number of documents. Those documents have now been included within the Lee Harvey Oswald 201 file to be processed and released to NARA.

3. This concludes the Agency's action on this request. If you have any questions, please advise.

J. Barry Harrelson

13-00000

MEMORANDUM

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT

September 12, 1998

To: Laura Denk
Executive Director

cc: Bob Skwirot
CIA Team Leader

From: Michelle Combs *Michelle Combs*
Associate Director for Research and Review

Subject: CIA-IR-35 Source Identified in RIF 104-10151-10206

In CIA Informal Request for Additional Records and Information CIA-IR-35, the Review Board requested additional information on a source identified in RIF number 104-10151-10206 as having given the CIA additional information on Lee and Marina Oswald and their time in the Soviet Union. At the request of the Review Board, the CIA searched its compartmented files and databases for additional information on this source and the raw intelligence information given by this source to the CIA. CIA provided the source's 201 file which was examined by the Review Board staff. No assassination records were designated from this 201 file. CIA also provided sections of briefing reports, an audiotape, and portions of transcripts of conversations between the source and interviewers on Lee Harvey Oswald. A final memorandum from this source was also found to be located in the post-1978 volume of Oswald's 201 file. All of these materials were designated as assassination records and will be included in the JFK Collection at the National Archives.

Given the recentness of the information and the sensitivity of the source, the Review Board agreed to protect the source's true name and cryptonym. Documents from this source are identified as the product of "a valued American intelligence source who was a senior, but not general rank, official in the intelligence service (KGB) of the former USSR; specifically, he served in the Second Chief Directorate which was responsible for internal counter-intelligence efforts."

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File 4.20.1 and 4.20.4

SECRET

OIM-98-0084
06 August 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: (U) Executive Director
Assassination Records Review Board

FROM: (U) Lee S. Strickland
Chief, Information Review Group
Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: (S) Protection of IJDECANTER Cryptonym

1. (S) The CIA Deputy Executive Director has asked that I respond to the Assassination Records Review Board ("ARRB" or "Board") regarding their current deliberations as to postponement of certain very limited information in one document -- specifically, the actual cryptonym of a CIA source (IJDECANTER). It is our considered judgment that the release of this cryptonym, in the particular context of the given document (SX-59777 of 15 December 1991), and juxtaposed with the *Los Angeles Times* article of 29 December 1997, would provide an identifiable benefit to the Russian counterintelligence effort and concomitant damage to US intelligence interests.

2. (S) Mindful, however, of the Board's statutory purpose and objectives, this memorandum also proposes a substitution of a fictitious cryptonym (*e.g.*, "TRUSTED") for the actual cryptonym IJDECANTER in this or any other document where it appears and would otherwise be releasable.

3. (U) As a preliminary matter, I would respectfully ask the Board and staff to note the classified nature of this memorandum, to limit access to those individuals properly cleared, and to return it to Agency representatives at the conclusion of your deliberations.

4. (S) As the Board is aware, the relevant document has been released almost in its entirety. The released version reports that a Soviet official (Boris ZHURAVLEV) had provided

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CL Reason: 1.5(c)
Decl On: X1
Drv From: HUM 4-82

SUBJECT: (S) Protection of IJDECANTER Cryptonym

information to the effect that OSWALD was a KGB source. It continues by stating that CIA did not believe ZHURAVLEV to be a credible source. It continues by stating that this CIA assessment is supported by reporting from another source (identity redacted but, in fact, IJDECANTER). It concludes by stating that this source (IJDECANTER) has had his "... *bona fides* ... *fully established [by CIA]*." **It is this final fact which is critical to our request. By having released this substantive information -- *"bona fides ... established"* -- and by otherwise having IJDECANTER known to the public in true name and crypt, we must protect the cryptonym here so that the key intelligence judgment of CIA is not compromised.**

5. (C) The practice of counterintelligence (CI) -- and hence the issue of damage to national security -- proceeds from four basic questions:

- what information was compromised?
- what foreign intelligence service(s) received the information?
- what understanding of the information did the service(s) have?
- what information did the intelligence service(s) believe and thus act on to its benefit and to the detriment of the United States?

6. (C) The first two questions are largely factual and can be acquired through a combination of confessions, polygraph interviews, and/or assumptions based on access. Questions three and four, however, are the most difficult and the most important for both the acquiring intelligence service and the target intelligence service.

7. (S) With further respect to question three, if a foreign government fully understands the substance (*i.e.*, the import), they will be able to exploit the information fully and the damage will be far beyond the ostensible value. A perfect example of this is the Boyce/Lee espionage case. The information compromised was a seemingly innocuous operational manual for a

SUBJECT: (S) Protection of IJDECANTER Cryptonym

satellite. What the Soviets were able to deduce was devastating to American intelligence. The Soviets, based on other information they had acquired through signals intelligence, concluded that an imaging satellite they had believed to be non-operational was in fact operational and actively imaging their territory. Since the Soviets had believed it was non-operational, they had taken no countermeasures (i.e., concealment) and the US had acquired a treasure trove of intelligence. Immediately upon learning the true status, they took extensive countermeasures and invaluable intelligence was directly and immediately lost.

8. (S) With further respect to question four, we have the quintessential factor for exploitation. If the foreign service believes its asset, they act on the information to the detriment of the United States; if they do not, the United States may escape damage fully or to some degree. This is the critical question that a foreign country must answer and it is the critical information that we must protect vis-à-vis defectors in our fold.

9. (S) In the matter at hand, we are very constrained by what the Russian government knows by virtue of their own knowledge and what they have acquired from the substantially released document and the *Los Angeles Times* article. The Russians know that Sergei PAPUSHIN (*i.e.,* IJDECANTER) defected to the United States; they know or suspect what he told the US; they know or suspect that we fully understood the import of what he said; ***they do not know, however, whether we believed him and thus incorporated his information into our operational practices and activities.*** And it would be critically damaging today to confirm to the Russians the final piece of the PAPUSHIN puzzle and allow them to have the ultimate benefit from what heretofore has been a US intelligence success.

10. (C) Indeed, as a reference point for this discussion, we can look briefly to the NOSENKO story. Here, also, the Russians knew the first three parts of the puzzle. What they did not know was whether we had accepted his story or not. Indeed, the CIA did not know the answer for a long period of time and this lack of knowledge was crippling to our FI effort against the Soviet Union and our entire CI program for a substantial period of time.

SUBJECT: (S) Protection of IJDECANTER Cryptonym

11. (S) In sum, question 4 -- *bona fides* -- is the CI key. The CIA to date has released all of the substantive information relating to IJDECANTER in this particular document. But we must protect his cryptonym here, in this particular document, if we are to preclude a substantial CI benefit to the Russian Federal Security Service when they assess this new information in light of their previous knowledge and acquired information, including, of course, information on the public record via the media.

12. (S) While the foregoing showing of intelligence damage is the most critical and legally compelling issue, there are three additional points of relevance vis-à-vis harm:

- First, is foreign relations. In our judgment, the Russians ~~are~~ fully expect that, after Aldrich Ames, the United States is considering avenues of reprisal. This specific release might well be viewed as a public move to embarrass them and it would serve only to exacerbate tensions.

- Second, is another potential intelligence benefit to the Russian service. This specific release could arguably provide them with insights into our capability to assess the *bona fides* of defectors. The Russian service knows if IJDECANTER was real; the CIA does not know this for certain.

- And third, there is an equitable issue. The CIA has never officially confirmed that PAPUSHIN was a defector in our custody and under our control; the CIA has pledged to protect the relationship; but we agree that it is publicly known at least to some degree. However, because his wife, child and father remain in Russia today, we would urge the Board to be cautious and consider postponement also for this reason. Quite candidly, I can not predict with any certainty whether the Russian government today would take action against the family from this proposed release. But I would urge caution here since the information at issue is minimal, not critical to the public understanding, and arguably harmful to living persons.

SUBJECT: (S) Protection of IJDECANTER Cryptonym

13. (U) I would be pleased to appear before the Board in person to respond to any particular questions and am hopeful that this important information can be postponed from public release.

Lee S. Strickland

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CIA TALKING POINTS

re Protection of "IJDECANTER" Cryptonym
Before the Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB)

26 AUGUST 1998

- The ADDO -- Jim Pavitt -- has asked that I address the Board on an issue of extreme importance to the Directorate of Operations and the CIA.

  - We request the postponement of certain very limited information in one document -- specifically, the actual cryptonym of a CIA source (IJDECANTER).

  - It is our considered judgment that the release of this cryptonym, in the particular context of the given document (SX-59777 of 15 December 1991), and juxtaposed with the *Los Angeles Times* article of 29 December 1997, would:

    - provide an identifiable benefit to the Russian counter-intelligence effort,

    - result in concomitant damage to US counter- intelligence interests, and,

    - have a chilling impact on cooperation of current and prospective intelligence sources given this disclosure which could be viewed as an official betrayal of confidence.

- Mindful, however, of the Board's statutory purpose and objectives, we propose however:

  - a substitution of a fictitious cryptonym ***(e.g., "TRUSTED")*** for the actual cryptonym IJDECANTER in this or any other document where it appears and would otherwise be releasable, and/or,

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- if desired, a textual explanation of the cryptonym in the nature of a factual description of the source ***(e.g., "a valued American intelligence source who was a senior, but not general rank, official in the intelligence service (KGB) of the former USSR; specifically, he served in the Second Chief Directorate which was responsible for internal counter-intelligence efforts."***

"U"

- As the Board is aware, the relevant document has been released almost in its entirety.
  - The released version reports that a Soviet official (Boris ZHURAVLEV) had provided information to the effect that OSWALD was a KGB source.
  - It continues by stating that CIA did not believe ZHURAVLEV to be a credible source.
  - It continues by stating that this CIA assessment is supported by reporting from another source (identity redacted but, in fact, IJDECANTER).
  - It concludes by stating that this source (IJDECANTER) has had his "... *bona fides ... fully established [by CIA]*."
  - ***It is this final fact which is critical.***
  - ***By having released this substantive information -- "bona fides ... established" -- <u>AND</u> by otherwise having IJDECANTER known to the public in true name and crypt, <u>THEN WE MUST PROTECT</u> the cryptonym here so that the key intelligence judgment of CIA is not compromised.***

- I would appreciate a few moments to explain, with I hope some degree of specificity, why identifiable damage would come from this disclosure -- the disclosure of the crypt in this particular instance along with this key intelligence judgment.

- The practice of counterintelligence (CI) -- and hence the issue of damage to national security -- proceeds from four basic questions:

    - what information was compromised?

    - what foreign intelligence service(s) received the information?

    - what understanding of the information did the receiving intelligence service(s) have?

    - what information did the receiving intelligence service(s) believe and thus act on to its benefit and to the detriment of the other party?

- The first two questions are largely factual and can be acquired through a combination of confessions, polygraph interviews, and/or assumptions based on access.

- Questions three and four, however, are the most difficult and the most important for both the acquiring intelligence service and the target intelligence service.

- Question 3 is important (*e.g.,* Boyce Lee case) but is not really an issue here since the US fully understood the information presented.

- Question 4, however, is the quintessential factor for exploitation.

    - If the receiving intelligence service believes its asset (*e.g.,* a defector), they act on the information to the detriment of the other service.

- If they do not, the other service may escape damage fully or to some degree.

- This is the critical question that a foreign country must answer and it is the critical information that we must protect vis-à-vis defectors in our fold.

- In the matter at hand, we are very constrained by what the Russian government knows by virtue of their own knowledge and what they have acquired from the substantially released document and the *Los Angeles Times* article.

  - The Russians know that Sergei PAPUSHIN (*i.e.,* IJDECANTER) defected to the United States;

  - they know or suspect what he told the US;

  - they know or suspect that we fully understood the import of what he said;

  - ***they do not know, however, whether we believed him and thus incorporated his information into our operational practices and activities.***

  - ***And it would be critically damaging today to confirm to the Russians the final piece of the PAPUSHIN puzzle and allow them to have the ultimate benefit from what heretofore has been a US intelligence success.***

- In sum, question 4 -- *bona fides* -- is the CI key.

  - The CIA to date has released all of the substantive information relating to IJDECANTER in this particular document.

  - But we must protect his cryptonym here, in this particular document, if we are to preclude a substantial CI benefit to the Russian Federal Security Service when they assess this new information in light of their previous knowledge and acquired information, including,

of course, information on the public record via the media.

- There is additional damage that will accrue from not officially protecting the identity of IJDECANTER.
  - Any unilateral violation of a clandestine trust has a devastating, compounding consequence for an intelligence organization.
  - It insidiously feeds the concern of other foreign assets -- current and past -- who will logically fear that CIA will acknowledge their own clandestine relationship at some future point in time.
  - Their fear could be sufficient to force them to take self-protective measures (e.g., disengagement by current assets or public statements by inactive ones).
  - Additionally, such violations of a clandestine trust most assuredly impact upon the willingness of potential future assets to establish a clandestine relationship with CIA. Indeed, we know form experience that this complicates our ability to obtain critical intelligence, particularly against the harder targets (*e.g.*, terrorism).
- There are other damages that I will touch only briefly upon in the interests of the Board's time. They are not insignificant, however.
  - ONE, is foreign relations.
    - In our judgment, the Russians are fully expect that, after Aldrich Ames, the United States is considering avenues of reprisal.
    - This specific release might well be viewed as a public move to embarrass them and it would serve only to exacerbate tensions.

- TWO, is another potential intelligence benefit to the Russian service.

  - This specific release could arguably provide them with insights into our capability to assess the *bona fides* of defectors.

  - The Russian service knows if IJDECANTER was real; the CIA does not know this for certain.

- THIRD, is an equitable issue.

  - The CIA has never officially confirmed that PAPUSHIN was a defector in our custody and under our control;

  - The CIA has pledged to protect the relationship;

  - While we acknowledge that that it is publicly known at least to some degree -- nevertheless his wife, child and father remain in Russia today vulnerable to whatever official or unofficial action the current government might take.

  - Quite candidly, I can not predict with any certainty whether the Russian government today would take action against the family from this proposed release.

  - But I would urge caution here since the information at issue is minimal, not critical to the public understanding, and arguably harmful to living persons.

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(last modified at 1500 hours, 25 august 1998)